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Likewise, where the tax was placed upon the corporate property, such
as cars travelling in and out of the state, and such number of all the
company's cars was taxed as the mileage in the state bore to the total
mileage, the court found that the property was arbitrarily valued too
high and held the tax invalid.10 So with a tax based upon the gross
receipts and measured by the proportion that the business done in the
state bears to the entire business." But a tax upon gross receipts from
business done in the state has been upheld when it was in lieu of all
other taxes, thus distinguishing it from the case last cited.U Taxes
upon the net income of non-residents derived from all property or
business carried on within the state have been sustained recently. 3
Thus it appears that state taxation will be sustained when a bona fide
attempt to estimate the "true value" or allocate the property has been
made and a just result reached. No distinction has been made between
a tax based upon capital stock, gross receipts, net income, gross busi-
ness, or tangible corporate property when properly apportioned. Nor
is there ground for distinction between a tax which is in effect an excise
tax and a tax upon corporate property, although the court would seem
to be more inclined to uphold the latter.14 Each case stands on its own
merits as to justice in the result. The court's decision in the principle
case, sustaining the tax on the ground that though most of the income
was Ireceived outside Connecticut it was received from manufacture
in Connecticut, is in harmony with 'principles previously announced.1 5
A MERE QUANTUM MERUIT FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES.
It may be true, in this country at least, that a lawyer is worthy of
his hire, but this does not mean that he is always to get what he thinks
value. The company had no terminals in that state and its road bed was con-
structed across plains at much smaller expense than in other states where the
nature of the country and the size and number of the cities made railroad build-
ing more costly. See Fargo v. Hart (19o4) I93 U. S. 49o, 24 Sup. Ct 498.
10 Union Tank Line v. Wright (19ig) 249 U. S. 275, 39 Sup. Ct. 276. See
COMMENTS (igig) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 802.
' .Meyer v. Wells Fargo and Co. (1912) 223 U. S. 298, 32 Sup. Ct. 218.
12 U. S. Express Co. v. Minn. (912) 223 U. S. 335, 32 Sup. Ct. 211. Likewise
taxing gross earnings from car lines operated in the state, in lieu of all other
taxes, has been held constitutional. Cudahy Packing Co. v. Minn. (918) 246
U. S. 450, 38 Sup. Ct 373.
" Travis v. Yale Towne Mfg. Co. (i92o, U. S.) 4a Sup. Ct. 228; Shaffer v.
Carter (192o, U. S., 4o Sup. Ct. 221 ; see Deganay v. Lederer (iI99) 250 U. S. 376,
39 Sup. Ct. 524.
' See U. S. Express Co. v. Minn. (1912) 223 U. S. 335, 344 ff., 32 Sup. Ct. 211,
214 ff.
"For a more complete discussion of this subject with the authorities collected
see Powell, Indirect Encroachment of Federal Authority by the Taxing Powers
of the States (1917-18) 31 HARv. L. REV. 321, 572, 721, 932; (1918-19) 32 id.
234, 374, 634, 902.
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his hire should be. He may recover in quantum meruit the "reason-
able value" of his services practically everywhere in the United States,'
but a series of recent cases has shown that there may nevertheless be
obstacles in his way of recovering a definite and agreed fee. If such
fee is contingent, it is, according to the Canons of Legal Ethics of the
American Bar Association, subject to the supervision of the court, in
order that the client may be protected from unjust charges.
2 Except
for this, the fee when fairly agreed upon is recoverable by a lawyer
who has completed the promised service.3 If the lawyer is in default,
he may by the better rule recover nothing.4 If, however, he is ready
and willing to perform but is wrongfully discharged by his client, a
conflict of authority has developed. Probably the majority of cases
allow him in such case to recover his agreed fee,5 but the minority
dissent has been reinforced by strong decisions in New York in
'Newman v. Washington (1827, Tenn.) Mart. & Y. 79; Costigan, Cases on
Legal Ethics (1917) 484; Adams v. Stevens (1841, N. Y.) 26 Wend. 451. In
New Jersey an express promise of a fee is necessary. Bentley v. Fidelity &
Deposit Co. (I9o8) 75 N. J. L. 828, 89 Atl. 2o2, 127 Am. St. Rep. 841, note. See
also cases collected 6 C. J. 719; i Thornton, Attorneys at Law (1914) secs. 414,
487. As to the English rule contra, see note 19 infra. This was the early rule
in Pennsylvania, Mooney v. Lloyd (i8ig, Pa.) 5 S. & R. 412, later overruled in
Foster v. Jack (1835, Pa.) 4 Watts, 334.
'Canon 13. The Canons of Ethics are reprinted in each volume of Am. Bar.
Assn. Reports since Vol. 33 (except Vols. 35 and 36), also in Costigan, op. cit.,
at p. 570. While these canons are not statutes, they are given much weight in
such proceedings as those for the disciplining of lawyers: In re Morrison
(I92o, S. D.) 178 N. W. 732; People v. Berezniak (1920) 292 Ill. 305, 127 N. E:
36; (1920) 5 MINN. L. REv. 71. Courts have refused to enforce unconscionable
contingent fee contracts, but they hesitate to base such action on the size of the
fee alone. Taylor v. Bemiss (1884) 22O U. S. 42, 3 Sup. Ct. 441; 6 C. J. 741.
The Canons of Ethics seem not to have affected the situation. Ridge v. Healy
(1918, C. C. A. 8th) 251 Fed. 798, 804; In re D'Adamo's Estate (1916, Surro.)
94 Misc. I, 157 N. Y. Supp. 374; In re Meng (igg) 227 N. Y. 264, 125 N. E,
500.
'See references to cases collected in note i supra.
'Cases collected 6 C. J. 726; Thornton, op. cit., sec. 450; see also Mills v.
Metropolitan St. Ry. (192o, Mo.) 221 S. W. i.
'Dorshimer v. Herndon (915) 98 Neb. 4r21, 153 N. W. 496; Scheinesohn v.
Lenzonek (1911) 84 Oh. St. 424, 95 N. E. 913, Ann. Cas. 1912 C, 737, note. See
also cases collected L. R. 1917 F, 406; 6 C. J. 734.
'Martin v. Camp (1916) 219 N. Y. 170, 114 N. E. 46, L. R. A. 1917F, 402, note,
reversing (1914) 161 App. Div. 61o, 146 N. Y. Supp. 1O41. See criticism by
W. A. Estrich, Right to Discharge an Attorney (1918) 25 CASE AND COMMENT,
563; (1916) 30 HARv. L. REv. 183; 2 Williston, Contracts (292o) sec. 1029.
Cf. (1916) 26 YALE LAW JOuRNAL, 153. The decision in the lower court
was approved in (1914) 28 HARV. L. REv. ioi and (914) 14 Coi. L. REv. 597.
Earlier cases in accord with Martin v. Camp are Louque v. Dejan (1911) 129
La. 519, 56 So. 427, 38 L R. A. (i. s.) 389, note; Polsley v. Anderson (1874)
7 W. Va. 202; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Semmes (89o) 73 Md. 9, 20 Atl. x27;
Parish v. McGowan (1912) 39 App. D. C. 184 (discharge before substantial
compliance). Cf. also Henry v. Vance (igoi) iir Ky. 72,'63 S. W. 273. As
YALE LAW JOURNAL
1916 and in Minnesota7 and South Dakota8 in 192o. Oregon, however,
has recently decided with the majority without noting the opposing
rule.9 The theory of what may perhaps be termed the New York rule,
in view of the general resort to Martin v. Camp ° as authority, is that
since the client has the "right" to discharge the lawyer at any time, the
exercise of that "right" is not to be followed by the same duty of paying
the agreed fee as though it had not been exercised.
It is proposed to examine this viewpoint, particularly since it has
been the subject of rather general criticism."' It may be admitted at
once that the onus is on those who support this rule to justify it on
some compelling reasons of policy, since it is at variance with the
ordinary rule of agency or employment. 2  Do such reasons of policy
exist?
the above cases show, this result seems more easily reached where the contract
is for a .contingent fee, 6 C. J. 725. See Ramey v. Graves (192o, Wash.)
191 Pac. 8oi. In Ennis v. Beers (1911) 84 Conn. 61o, 8o At. 772, only quantum
meruit was allowed- against a minor.
"Lawler v. Dunn (i92o, Minn.) 176 N. W. 989, two judges dissentin:; see
criticism, (192o) 4 MINN. L Rav. 44I, (i92o) 2o Co. L. Rav. 729.
'Ritz v. Carpenter (i92O, S. D.) 178 N. W. 877. Ramey v. Graves, supra
note 6, in accord, is rested upon the ground that the contract was for a
contingent fee.
'Dblph v. Speckart (I92O, Ore.) x86 Pac. 32 A note on this case in (192o)
2D Co. L Rav. 485 discusses another point. See also Teiser v. Barlow (1920,
Ore.) 192 Pac. 394, Allen v. Brooke (I92O, Ga.) xo2 S. E. 832, and dictum in
accord in Mills v. Metropolitan St. Ry., supra note 4, at p. 5.
"Supra note 6. ' See notes 6 and 7 supra.
"Though an attorney is an officer of the court, as between him and his
client the general rules of agent and principal apply. I Mechem, Law of Agency
(2d ed. 1914) sec. 2150. In the ordinary contract of employment, an employee
wrongfully discharged recovers his damages based upon the contract price less
such damages as he might have reasonably avoided. Williston, Contracts
(192o) secs. 1o28, 1358 ff. That the rule as to minimizing damages does not
ordinarily apply to attorneys who have not contracted to give a definite portion
of their time, see Dixon v. Volunteer Bank (913) 213 Mass. 345, 100 N. E.
65s; 6 C. J. 725. It is submitted that Professor Williston's criticism of
Martin v. Camp, supra note 6--"It is a fundamental principle of contracts
that both parties must be bound by the agreement"--states merely the logical
rule to be applied in the absence of any countervailing policy. He himself states
one exception-voidable promises-which is a much more inclusive class than
the example he suggests of minors, and he himself points out that relations
between attorney and client are subject to careful scrutiny, with the burden
upon the attorney to show the fairness of any dealings with his client. Willis-
ton, op. cit., secs. io29, 1627.' Even though he limits this rule to dealings after
the relation of attorney and client exists, he shows that his "fundamental" rule
has some gaps. Moreover, it is suggested that the same factors of more exten-
sive knowledge or means of knowledge on the attorney's part and confidence
on the client's part, at least to some 'extent exist at the formation of the
relation, so that it, too, should be subject to some scrutiny. The statements
in cases like Elmore v. Johnson (1892) 143 IIl. 513, 32 N. E. 413, that then the
parties deal with each other at arm's length seems too broad. Even from the
standpoint of logic alone it would seem that courts have power to control their
own officers.
COMMENTS 517
On these points the courts in the recent cases might well have been
more definite. They speak of an implied or inferred condition 
of the
contract and then rely upon the "right" of discharge, which 
does
suggest the policy involved, but, as the criticisms show, with not 
enough
clearness to convince. 13 Any person has the power "to break 
his
contract," i. e., to change the form of his duty to the plaintiff 
from one
based upon his promise to one based upon the remedial action of 
the
court. Where the courts will order specific performance, this. 
new
duty is not essentially different from his original duty, except that 
it
is more serious by reason of costs and damages. As courts will 
not
attempt to enforce specifically contracts of personal service,
14 it would
follow that in any such contract a party has power to substitute money
damages for performance. What the courts are really interested 
in
here is whether the termination is privileged, i. e., whether no duty 
to
pay damages as for a wrongful discharge will be enforced by the
courts.
1 5
It is stated by countless authorities as well settled that a client has.
the "right" to discharge his attorney and to substitute another at any
time with or without cause and in spite of any contract. The reason
of policy assigned is the necessity inherent in the relationship of absolute
confidence of the client in his attorney; when such confidence ends,
the relationship should end. 6 But under the majority rule above
stated, the courts say that a discharge without cause amounts to a
breach of contract, and the damages are measured by the contract
price.1 7 Hence the discharge of the lawyer, unless for justifiable
cause, would not be a defense to an action for the contract price. It
is difficult to see what is the practical utility of the "right" of substitu-
' See criticism of these cases on this point (I92Q) 29 Ymm LAw JouRNAL,
921. The flamboyant language in Ritz v. Carpenter, supra note 8, is subject to
the same criticism.
"It has been held that there is no room for the application of the rule of
Lumley v. Wagner (i85z, Ch.) i DeG. M. & G. 6o4, to a discharge by an employer,
and probably it is not applicable in any event to a contract for legal services.
See Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence ( 4th ed. i919) secs. 1712, 1713.
'See on this point Estrich, op. cit. note 6.
" "Indeed, the right of a client so to discharge his attorney is practically
indispensable in view of the delicate and confidential relations which exist
between attorney and client, and of evil to the client's interests, engendered
by friction or distrust." Thornton, op. cit, sec. 138, with cases collected. See
also 6 C. J. 676; cases in note z8 infra. So'also, as the client must have full
control of his case, an agreement that a suit -should not be settled without
the attorney's consent is void as against public policy. Matter of Snyder (1907)
1go N. Y. 66, 82 N. E. 742, 14 L R. A. (x. s.) lOI, note, i3 Ann. Cas. 441, note.
See also Ann. Cas. I913 D 306, note; 3 A. L ,. 472; Moran v. Simpson
(i919, N. D.) 173 N. W. 769; Sizon, V. Chicago etc. Ry. (I92o N. D.) I77 N. W.
iO7, overruling Greendeaf v. Minneapolis etc. Ry. (915) 3o N. D. ii2, 151 N. W.
879. The same policy is expressed by the cases holding that a testator cannot
force his executors to employ a particular attorney in settling his estate. Foster
v. Elsley (i88i) 19 Ch. D. s18: (1915) 28 HARV. L. REV. 530.
"" See note 5 supra.
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tion universally so carefully cherished by the courts, if the client is nobetter off than any party to a confract of personal service who desires toterminate it. If a client must show legal cause in each case beforedischarging his attorney or else pay the attorney whatever hIigh feemay have been agreed upon as the price of success, then it is obviousthat the relationship will continue after the client has ceased to haveabsolute confidence in "either the integrity or the judgment or the"capacity of the attorney.""8  The New York rule is absolutely correctin treating the "right to discharge" as a barren power if the contractfee is nevertheless to be paid. If the New York rule is to be followed,in all honesty the courts should cease their talk about the nature of therelationship and its requirement of absolute confidence, since they areaccording nothing more than is inhereht in any similar contract for
services.
It is submitted further that independent rules of policy justify theNew York rule. Under the English law a barrister may not recovera fee by suit.' 9 Only a solicitor may so sue.2 0 It is then the ideal ofthe legal system from which our law springs that the counselor-at-law
is not a hireling of the market, but is an officer of the court whose dutyit is to see that justice is done and who receives from those whom hehas protected such honorarium as their gratitude dictates.2' Such anideal may easily degenerate into a cloak for hypocrisy,22 and yet, asmany of our greatest lawyers have pointed out, there is somethingfine in holding as an ideal of the profession the ministry of justicerather than the making of money.23 In spite of sneers and jibes, weknow that the best lawyers in the country to-day faithfully serve suchan ideal. We may go further and say that none but the poor-est grade of lawyer will sue for a fee except in case of great imposi-tion.2- The ordinary dispute as to fees is settled without court action.
"'Cf. Gage v. Atwater (19o2) 136 Calif. 17o, 17-, 68 Pac. 581; Henry v. Vance,supra note 6; Matter of Dunn (1912) 205 N. Y. 398, 98 N. E. 914.
"Kennedy v. Broun (i863, C. P.) 13 C. B. (x. s.) 677.' Poucher v. Norman (1825, K. B.) 3 B. & C. 744.The reasons of policy stated in Kennedy v. Broun, supra, have not met,however, with complete approval. See Reg. v'. Doutre (i88, H. L.) L. R.9 A. C. 745, 751; McDougall v. Campbell (1877) 41 U. C. Q. B. 332, 346, (Har-rison, C. J. dissenting); Christen v. Lacoste (1893) Que. Q. B. 142, i47,
pointing out the similarity of the Roman, French, and English systems; 6 C. J.719; Thornton, op. cit., sec. 4oo ff. But see Cohen, The Law-Business orProfession? (1919) 201 ff.
' Cf. cases in note 21, supra.
' On the English system of fees see quotations from Joseph H. Choate andothers collected in Costigan, op. cit. note i, at p. 481 if; Smith, Tustice and the
Poor (ig) 85, 86.
" See A. B. A. Canon 14: "Controversies with clients concerning compensa-tion are to be avoided by the lawye- so far as shall be compatible with hisself-respect and with his right to receive reasonable recompense for his services;and lawsuits with clients concerning fees should be resorted to only to preventinjustice, imposition or fraud."
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We may well look askance at a rule of law which will ordinarily be
resorted to only by the more offensive members of the bar.
A contract for an agreed fee by its very nature tends towards unfair-
ness. Lawyers' fees are difficult enough to *compute when all the
items, such as time involved, amount involved, and the result of the
litigation, are known. When substantially all factors of this kind are
undetermined, naturally the lawyer-the one party to the relation who
by his profession is familiar with the business in hand-will state a
fee sufficiently high to cover all contingencies. In Ritz v. Carpenter
(i92o, S. D.) 178 N. W. 877, plaintiff had been employed to defend
one accused of crime, and, according to his claim, after appearing at
the preliminary hearing for $250, agreed to appear at the trial for
$7,5oo.25 Moreover the fact that here the factors upon which fees are
ascertained are so uncertain will tend to foster contingent fee contracts,
the extortion and oppression of which have often been discussed.
26
In many of the cases adopting the New York rule, the same result
could have been reached by applying the provision of the Canons of
Ethics that the court should supervise contingent fees. 27 The provision
has not been as successful as might have been hoped, 28 and hence it
is wise that the courts have directly and conclusively taken control of
this particular problem.
The rule allowing only quantum meruit does not operate unfairly
to the attorney in actual practice, as anyone who has attempted to
contest attorneys' fees can testify. The attorney has all the advan-
tages in securing evidence to prove his case in any claim for the
reasonable value of his services, and the court or jury can be relied on
to take care of manifest unfairness upon the part of the client. If,
as stated in Ritz v. Carpenter, the jury may consider the agreed fee
in determining what would be such reasonable value, the lawyer is
fully protected.
The New York rule has been stated not to apply to cases where
the attorney "has changed his position or incurred expense" or "is"employed under a general retaining fee for a fixed period to perform
"legal services." It is submitted that the first exception is useless and
should be forgotten. An attorney has always changed his position by
merely accepting the employment, since he cannot thereafter be
employed on the opposite side. The second exception, a contract for
a fixed period, seems to be generally approved2 9 and has recently been
followed by the New York Court of Appeals in Greenburg v. Remick
'He explained his high charge for the trial on the ground of the ignominy
his appearing in defense of such a crime might bring on himself. But he
had already appeared at the preliminary hearing for the smaller sum.
H See citations in (1920) 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 82.
' Note 2, supra.
Cohen, op. cit. note 21, at p. 207. See also note 2, supra.
"Horn V. Western Land Assn. (875) 22 Minn. 233; Dixon v. Volunteer
Bank, supra note i2; cases collected L. R. A. 1917 E. 4o6, note.
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& Co. (1926, N. Y.) 129 N. E. 211, reversing the judgment of
the appellate division o which had sustained a demurrer to an attorney's
complaint for breach of contract for yearly employment. 1 Logically
the case is similar to that of employment for a particular case, but
practically the reasons of- policy are not so strong. Both parties are
able in advance to make a fairer estimate of the value of the services
for the fixed period than is possible where the amount of services to
be rendered is wholly indefinite, and one who has sufficient law business
to employ an attorney regularly is probably sufficiently informed as
to its character to avoid imposition. It would not have been undesir-
able for the court to assume control of this class of fees, though in
view of the difference in situation, probably it cannot reasonably be
criticised for failure to do so.
It is obvious that one's answer to the questions here involved will
turn upon the background of his own experience and the point of
view with which he approaches the problem. If his experience has
been (as it is suggested is the more general experience) that compara-
tively few clients are able to impose upon lawyers, while unfortunately
the converse is not true, his views will accord with those expressed in
Martin v. Camp. And they will be more strongly fortified if his point
of view is not that of the lawyer trying to make a living, but is that
of one seeking the general welfare of the community, which needs
urgently men of exceptional character as its "officers of the court."
It is unfortunate that such welfare may not coincide with the needs of
the young man with his way to make. Perhaps to some the answer
may seem harsh, but it is nevertheless sound that unless he wishes to
accommodate himself, to the high standards of the profession necessary
to the general welfare, he should employ his time and talents in other
fields.3 2  C.E.- C.
(192o) 191 App. Div. 947, i82 N. Y. Supp. 229."The court repeats the unfortunate statement in Martin v. Camp, supra
note 6, that "the right to discharge" the attorney is an implied condition of the
contract, and then adds, "unless expressly or otherwise negatived." This
last is against all authority, particularly in New York. See notes 16 and 18,
supra. The implication is one of law, not of fact. This shows the danger
of failing to recognize that an implication or presumption of law means simply
that whatever is to be so implied or presumed-here the fact of an agreement
-is no longer a necessary operative fact in the legal situation under considera-
tion. Cf. (i92o) 29 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 921.
"Cf. Cohen, op. cit. note 21, at p. 214.
